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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to study how the hedonic equilibrium
is modified when group-wise consumer heterogeneity with horizontal
differentiated housing supply is assumed. We complete the hedonic
segmentation analysis of Baudry and Maslianska¨ıa-Pautrel (2011a,b)
for vertical differentiation of housing supply by investigating the more
realistic case of horizontal differentiation. Our results confirm the seg-
mentation of the hedonic price function at equilibrium and the discon-
tinuity of the implicit price of environmental quality on the borders of
the segments. We also demonstrate that horizontal differentiation can
lead to a partial sorting of consumer demand for housing attributes at
hedonic equilibrium. Finally we show that according to model spec-
ification, the group-wise heterogeneity with horizontal differentiation
can lead to modification of welfare assessment related to changes in
environmental quality.
Keywords : Hedonic model, Group-wise consumers’ heterogeneity,
Horizontal differentiation
Introduction
The hedonic estimation is now a usual tool in environmental economic valu-
ation of local amenities or nuisances (see for example, Boyle and Kiel, 2001;
Simons and Saginor, 2006). It is based on the Rosen (1974) theoretical
∗GAINS-TEPP (University of Le Mans) and LEMNA (University of Nantes);
maria.pautrel@univ-lemans.fr
†We are particularly indebted to Marc Baudry and Yann Rebille´ for their valuable
guidance. We also wish to acknowledge Xavier Pautrel for his comments on this paper.
We remain responsible for any errors.
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model which analyzes the properties of the hedonic price function that arises
when a continuum of heterogeneous consumers choose among a continuum of
differentiated products. Consumers are supposed to be distributed continu-
ously between the extreme values of their heterogeneity parameters. Never-
theless, empirical observations suggest that several population groups (such
that active population and retirements, residents working in this area and
residents working outside the the area...) may coexist on a same territory.
This is often the case for heterogeneous territories with rich natural capital
on the one hand and high industrial development on the other hand. If such
heterogeneous groups of consumers coexist on the same area, what are the
implications for hedonic valuation of the environmental goods?
Baudry and Maslianska¨ıa-Pautrel (2011a,b) answer that question, inves-
tigating a groupe-wise buyers’ heterogeneity in the housing market with
vertical differentiation of the supply. The vertical differentiation means that
all consumers share the same preferences about housing attributes and dif-
fer by their income or preferences between housing and other consumption.
The authors demonstrate that such discrete heterogeneity with vertical dif-
ferentiation can lead to a hedonic price function segmentation.
The purpose of this paper is to reexamine these results in the case of an
horizontal differentiation of the housing supply. It is motivated by the fact
that with different groups on the same territory (such the active popula-
tion and retirements for example), we expect that the preferences on hous-
ing attributes are different between groups. It means that the aggregation
of housing attributes into housing service index depends on the parame-
ters group. Thus the housing supply is horizontally differentiated, like in
Lancaster (1966).
We develop a theoretical hedonic model of segmentation based on the
same structure than Baudry and Maslianska¨ıa-Pautrel (2011a,b). Never-
theless our modeling differs significantly in assumption about consumers
behavior because the differentiation is horizontal.
The two main features of our modeling, group-wise heterogeneity and
horizontal differentiated housing supply, play a major role in shaping the
outcome of the housing market. First, the distinction between continuous
and group-wise consumers’ heterogeneity is important in the hedonic model.
In the first case, when the heterogeneous parameter is distributed continu-
ously between two limits, each agent is atomistic and her housing purchase
cannot impact market prices: consumers are “hedonic price taker”.1. In the
second case, when the heterogeneous parameter distribution is discrete, con-
sumers of the same group are not still atomistic, their mass is not null but
1Continuous buyers heterogeneity is assumed in Rosen (1974), as well as in sorting
models dealing with hedonic price function analysis (Epple and Platt, 1998; Kuminoff,
2009, among others).
2
is equal to the group’s weight. Sellers have to take into account the choice
of each group when they propose their housing prices. Consequently the
market equilibrium results from strategic interactions between sellers and
buyers groups. This group-wise heterogeneity founds the hedonic model of
segmentation firstly developed by Baudry and Maslianska¨ıa-Pautrel (2011a)
Second, horizontal differentiation generally means that different groups
of consumers have different preferences for the same house (with the same
attributes).2 However it is possible that, in a particular case, all groups
have the same valuation of housing (when one or other housing attributes
is absent or at its minimal level). In the present paper, we study two cases:
when all consumers value in the same way the housing without environ-
mental quality, and when different groups have specific valuation of housing
without environmental or intrinsic quality. From the methodological point
of view, this distinction is about different specifications of Spence-Mirrlees
single-crossing condition for consumer preferences. From the economic point
of view, this distinction implies different consequences for the hedonic equi-
librium, the hedonic price function, the implicit prices of housing attributes
and thus for the environmental hedonic valuation.
Our modeling of group-wise consumers heterogeneity with horizontal
housing supply differentiation completes existing hedonic approaches: the
“traditional hedonic” model developed by Rosen (1974) and the “new he-
donic” or “sorting” models developed since the seminal article by Tiebout
(1956) (see for exemple, Epple and Platt, 1998; Epple and Sieg, 1999, Ku-
minoff, 2009).3
Our main results are threefold. First, we generalize the Baudry and
Maslianska¨ıa-Pautrel (2011a) result for the case of horizontal differentiation:
the group-wise consumers heterogeneity leads to a segmentation of the hedo-
nic price function in the housing market equilibrium. Hedonic price function
is continuous, but builed of different segments corresponding to each con-
sumer group. Consequently, on the one hand, the hedonic price function we
obtain, is based on individual characteristics, while in the “usual” hedonic
estimation procedure, individual characteristics appear only on the second
stage, once the hedonic price function estimated. On the other hand, the
segmentation of the hedonic price function implies a discontinuity of the
2Horizontal differentiation of the housing supply is commonly assumed in the hedonic
literature (see the Rosen (1974)’s model for example). Kuminoff (2006) and Bayer et al.
(2005) also introduce the horizontal differentiation in their sorting models, by assuming
that the differentiation is about households’ preferences for different local public goods
provided by each community. Those public goods can be viewed as different environmental
characteristics of housing, such that air quality (air quality in a given community can be
constant if the community area is relatively small).
3Figure 8 in the Appendix A presents the main assumption and the main results of
those three approaches.
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implicit price of environmental quality of housing on the borders of the seg-
ments. That invalidates the second stage of the procedure where the implicit
price function is assumed to be continuous.
Our second result is about sorting of the consumers demand. We demon-
strate that with a horizontal differentiation of housing supply, the segmen-
tation of hedonic price function can lead to partial sorting of the demand
for housing attributes by consumers groups (namely, in the case of group
specific valuation of alternatives “outside the environmental quality” and
“outside the intrinsic quality”). This result differs from the case of vertical
differentiated housing supply studied in Baudry and Maslianska¨ıa-Pautrel
(2011a,b), and can be viewed as dual to the partial two-dementional strat-
ification by consumer income and preferences in sorting models (Epple and
Platt, 1998).
Finally, the third result is about consumers surplus extraction in equi-
librium. Fixed supply and short-run assumption lead the sellers of a part of
housing to extract at equilibrium, the all consumer surplus of one or more
groups. We show that according to the model specifications , the group with
the lowest parameter of preferences for housing attributes it is not neces-
sarily the one with whole surplus extracted. Thus the segmentation have
implications for the assessment of welfare related to changes in environmen-
tal quality.
Section 1 presents the basic model and general equilibrium condition.
Section 2 derives equilibrium condition and analyses its property. Section 3
presents two applications for a nested CES direct utility function.
1 General framework
The economy has two consumption goods: housing and a numeraire. Hous-
ing is is characterized by an index of housing service H, function of two
housing attributes: H = h(Q,S), where S is intrinsic attribute and Q is
environmental attribute of the house. As in the Rosen (1974) model, the
housing price depends on the housing service index P = P (Q,S).4
1.1 Consumer behavior
Following the model of Rosen (1974), we consider an individual who has
distribute its income R between the purchase of a X (chosen as the nu-
meraire) and a housing, characterized by a level of service H = h(Q,S). A
4In this respect our model differs from sorting models, where the function of housing ser-
vice is supposed to be separated between a “quantitative” index of intrinsic characteristics
of dwelling S and an “qualitative” index of its environmental and neighborhood charac-
teristics Q, and only the qualitative index determines the price of housing (cf. Kuminoff,
2009). In our case, the price depends on both intrinsic and environmental characteristics
of dwelling.
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household’s utility depends on the housing service level and on its consump-
tion of a composite numeraire private good. Households are heterogeneous
by groups in their tastes about housing attributes, β.5 Then the housing
service index is written as:
H = h(Q,S|βi). (1)
We assume the function h(·) belongs to the class C1, is increasing and con-
cave, and satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees single crossing condition in β:6
∂
∂β
[
∂H/∂Q
∂H/∂S
]
> 0, ∀β. (H0)
Group-wise heterogeneity means that there are N different households
groups such that the share of population in each group is equal to ηi:
N∑
i=1
ηi = 1.
Households preferences are homogenous inside of each group. We assume
that groups are ordering by increasing order of the parameter β:
β1 < β2 < ... < βN . Then the household of the same group have the same
utility function and the same budget constraint. In addition, the individual
optimizing behavior corresponds to the optimizing behavior of the group
which the individual belongs.
The group’s i direct utility function is given by
U(h(Q,S|βi),X|Ω), (2)
where βi is the parameter of heterogeneous preferences for housing attributes,
Ω is a set of parameters common to all consumers. To simplify the nota-
tions, we omit Ω thereafter. We assume that the utility function belongs to
the class C2, is increasing and concave in its arguments.
The group’s i budget constraint is given by X + P (Q,S) = R.
Definition 1. Constrained utility function of an household from a group i
is
V (h(Q,S|βi), P ) ≡ U(h(Q,S|βi), R− P (Q,S)). (3)
The utility constraint differs from the indirect utility in that it does not
presuppose the optimizing behavior. It is obtained from the direct utility
function of the individual by substituting quantity X of the Hicksian com-
posite good by the maximum quantity R−P , that the agent can afford given
5We assume that households are homogeneous in their income as well as their prefer-
ences between housing and other consumption.
6Without loss of generality we assume that MRSQS is increasing in β.
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her budget constraints and the price P associated with a given level h(Q,S)
of the index of housing services.
The constrained utility function is used, among others, in hedonic price
models to introduce the fundamental concept of Rosen’s bid function
Definition 2. Rosen’s bid function for individual belonging to the group i
is defined implicitly by:
V (h(Q,S|βi), E
(k)
i (Q,S|βi, u
(k)
i )) = u
(k)
i , (4)
where u
(k)
i stands for the level of utility attained by individual at her current
location with the index of housing services H = h(Q(k), S(k)) and the price
P (k).
The equation (4) defines the family of bid functions of individuals belong-
ing to the group i: E
(k)
i = E
(k)
i (Q,S|βi, u
(k)
i ), parameterized by reference
utility level u
(k)
i .
The utility maximization problem subject to individual budget con-
straint is equivalent to the problem of minimization of housing expenditure,
that is the group’s big funciton:
∀i, min
u
(k)
i ∈DUi
E
(k)
i (h|R,u
(k)
i ), h ∈ Dhi, (5)
where Dhi is an interval (or union of intervals) of values h, characterizing
housing purchased by consumers in the group i. Since the definition of
bid function includes the consumer budget constraint (as defined from the
utility function constraint), the optimization program of consumers has not
constraint.
1.1.1 Two cases of groups preferences
We examine two different cases of groups preferences according to particular
Spence-Mirrlees conditions for constrained utility function. The first one is
the case with group identical valuation of “outside the environmental quality”
housing, the second one is the case with group specific valuation of “outside
the environmental quality” and “outside the intrinsic quality” housing.7
In the first case, we assume the constrained utility function satisfies
the following Spence-Mirrlees conditions:
7The case with the group identical valuation of “outside the intrinsic quality” housing
is similar from methodological point of view to the case with the group identical valuation
of “outside the environmental quality” housing and does not study in this paper.
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∀S,
∂
∂β
[
∂V/∂h · ∂h/∂Q
∂V/∂P
]
< 0, ∀β, (H
′
1)
∀Q,
∂
∂β
[
∂V/∂h · ∂h/∂S
∂V/∂P
]
= 0, ∀β (H
′
2)
Since in the space (Q,S, P ) the bid surface coincides with the surface of
iso constrained utility, the groups’ bid surfaces also satisfy the single-crossing
properties (H
′
1) and (H
′
2) (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Single-crossing property of groups’ bid surfaces under H
′
1 and
H
′
2
P
Q
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 (q
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βi<βj
The condition (H
′
1) means that in the space (Q,P ) for given value of S,
the slopes of the bid curves are ordered in increasing order of the parameter
β: to right of the intersection of two bid curves, consumers in the group with
a higher parameter β willing to pay a higher price for housing with the same
level of environmental quality Q at a fixed level of the intrinsic quality S.
Conversely, to the left of the intersection, consumers of this group willing to
pay a lower price for housing with the same level of environmental quality at
a fixed level of intrinsic quality. From the economic point of view it means
that increasing of the level of parameter β corresponds to households more
cary about the environmental quality of housing.
The condition (H
′
2) means that all groups have the identical prefer-
ences about intrinsic housing attribute at each level of Q. In the space
(S,P ), for given value of Q, bid curves of different groups coincide. In par-
ticularly, for Q = 0 all groups value in the same way the housing services
level: E(0, S|βi, ui) = E(0, S|βj , uj) ∀i, j and ∀S. This explains the name
of this case: group identical valuation of “outside the environmental quality”
housing. 8
8The case where all groups have the same preferences for environmental quality of
7
In the second case, we assume the constrained utility function sat-
isfies the following Spence-Mirrlees conditions:
∀S,
∂
∂β
[
∂V/∂h · ∂h/∂Q
∂V/∂P
]
< 0, ∀β, (H
′′
1)
∀Q,
∂
∂β
[
∂V/∂h · ∂h/∂S
∂V/∂P
]
> 0, ∀β (H
′′
2)
Since in the space (Q,S, P ) the bid surface coincides with the surface of
iso constrained utility, the groups’ bid surfaces also satisfy the single-crossing
properties (H
′′
1) and (H
′′
2) (see Figure 2 ).
Figure 2: Single-crossing property of groups’ bid surfaces under H
′′
1 and
H
′′
2
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As in the previously described case, the condition (H
′′
1) means that in
the space (Q,P ) for a fixed S, the slopes of the bid curves are ordered in
increasing order of the parameter β: on the right of the intersection of two
bid curves, consumers of the group with a higher parameter β willing to
pay a stronger housing prices for the same level of environmental quality
Q given a fixed level of the intrinsic quality S. Conversely, on the left of
the intersection, consumers of this group willing to pay a lower price for the
same level of environmental quality Q. Again the increase in the parameter
β corresponds to the individual preferences more and more stonger in terms
of the environmental quality of housing.
In its turn, the condition (H
′′
2) means that in the space (S,P ) for a given
level of Q, the slopes of the bid curves are ordered in decreasing order of the
parameter β: on the right of the intersection of two bid curves, consumers
of the group with a higher parameter β willing to pay a lower price for the
housing is mathematically equivalent to the case (H
′
2), and is not studied here since our
problematic deals with environmental valuation.
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same level of intrinsic quality S, and on the left of the intersection those
consumers willing to pay a stronger price.
From the economic point of view, conditions (H
′′
1) and (H
′′
2) mean a
kind of subsituabilite´ between housing characteristics which is more or less
strong according to the values of β.9 As about housing “outside the envi-
ronmental quality” with Q = 0 and housing “outside the intrinsic quality”
with S = 0, each group has its specific valuation of those housing:
E(0, S|βi, ui) 6= E(0, S|βj , uj), if βi 6= βj
E(Q, 0|βi, ui) 6= E(Q, 0|βj , uj), if βi 6= βj
Implications
The Spence-Mirrlees conditions imply that two arbitrary bid surfaces of the
two different groups, have only one intersection curve.
Definition 3. The intersection curve of two groups i and j is a locus of the
points (q, s) such that:
Ei(q, s|βi, u
(ki)
i ) = Ej(q, s|βj , u
(kj)
j ) (6)
(6) defines implicitly the equation of the intersection curve, noted s = gij(q).
Proposition 1. A) Under assumptions H
′
1 and H
′
2, the intersection
curve between two groups i and j is a vertical line q = Q˜ij .
B) Under assumptions H
′′
1 and H
′′
2, the intersection curve of the groups
is a strictly monotone function in the plan (Q,S).
Proof. A) Immediately from single-crossing conditions H
′
1 and H
′
2.
B) Immediately from sigle-crossing conditions H
′′
1 and H
′′
2.
1.2 Sellers behavior
Following Baudry and Maslianska¨ıa-Pautrel (2011a,b) we assume the short-
run case of the Rosen (1974) hedonic model, where supply is supposed fixed.
This assumption is consistent with existent empirical hedonic studies. We
assume that housing attributes are distributed on intervals [0;Qmax] and
[0;Smax] with a joint density function ϕ(Q,S).
10
9The case of complementarity of the two housing attributes corresponding to the same
sign of derivatives with respect to β, is not considered in this paper and is a way of future
research.
10To simplify the notation and calculations, we assume without loss of generality that
Qmin = 0 and that Smin = 0.
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Moreover, unlike the model of Rosen, sellers are assumed to be homo-
geneous. Thus the sellers’ bid functions are identical and correspond to the
price function that represents, in a general case, a lower envelope of sellers’
bid functions.
Finally we assume that supply is completed by “outside the market”
alternative:
Definition 4. “Outside the market” alternative is defined by:
P (h(0, 0|β)) = P (0) = 0, ∀β. (7)
It is always possible to obtain zero housing characteristics for the price
P = 011.
Given the assumptions regarding the housing supply, utility maximiza-
tion problem of each seller v is equivalent to maximizing of the selling price
of her housing characterized by a level of service Hv = h(Qv , Sv):
∀v, ∀Hv maxPv(Hv) (8)
1.3 Definition of equilibrium
In the traditional hedonic model, the equilibrium on the housing market
is defined if there is a function p(h) such that the distribution of housing
demand and the distribution of housing supply are equal
Qd(h) = Qs(h) ∀h, (9)
and buyers and sellers have an optimal behavior.
In the segmentation model buyers form homogeneous groups of non-zero
weight, thus sellers have to take into consideration buyers’ behavior when
define their selling prices. In particular two types of constraints must be
consider for each buyer: participation and incentive constraints. The first
type concerns the effective participation of the buyer to the market, that is
her arbitrage condition between buying a home and choosing the alterna-
tive “outside the market”. The second type of constraints concerns different
alternatives met by the consumer on the market and it is the arbitrage condi-
tion between the purchase of particular dwelling and the purchase of another
dwelling on the market. Therefore, hedonic equilibrium of the segmentation
model is defined as:
Definition 5 (Hedonic equilibrium of the segmentation model.). Under the
assumption of optimizing behavior of buyers and sellers, the market equilib-
rium is reached when the following three conditions are satisfied:
11The definition assumes that the “outside the market” alternative does not depend on
the type of housing differentiation, or the nature of consumers heterogeneity.
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Condition 1 (participative constraint): Each buyer a prefer purchase a
dwelling rather than “outside the market” alternative:
∀a, V (Ha, P
∗(Ha), R|βa) ≥ V (0, 0, R|βa), Ha ∈ Dh (10)
Condition 2 (incentive constraints): For unchanged prices, each buyer is
better off with the house she buys than with the houses bought but other
buyers:
∀a, V (Ha, P
∗(Ha), R|βa) ≥ V (H
′
, P ∗(H
′
), R|βa), ∀H
′
∈ Dh, (11)
Condition 3 (maximal extraction of surplus): None of the sellers, v, is able
to find a buyer at a higher price:
∀v, Pv(Hv) = max
a ∈ {A},
k : uka ∈ DUa
Eka(Hv|R,u
k
a) (12)
The set of prices P ∗ resulting from this optimization program character-
izes the hedonic price function:
Definition 6. Hedonic price. For any level of the index H of housing ser-
vices, the hedonic price yields the highest of the individual bids where each
individual bid function is defined in reference to the house bought by the
individual and the associated market equilibrium price:
∀H P (H) = max
u
(k)
a ∈DUa
E∗a(H|R,u
(k)
a ). (13)
In the case of horizontal differentiation, the hedonic equilibrium defini-
tion 5 becomes:
∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}
max
u(i)
Ei
(
q, s|βi, u
(i)
)
, (q, s) ∈ [Qi−1, Qi]× [Si−1, Si] (14)
s.c.
V
(
h(q, s|βi), Ei
(
q, s|βi, u
(i)
))
≥ V (0, 0) (15)
V
(
h(q, s|βi), Ei
(
q, s|βi, u
(i)
))
≥ V
(
h(q˜, s˜|βi), Ej
(
q˜, s˜|βj , u
(j)
))
, (16)
∀j 6= i, (q˜, s˜) ∈ [Qj−1, Qj]× [Sj−1, Sj ]∫ Si
Si−1
∫ Qi
Qi−1
ϕ(q, s) dq ds = ηi (17)
The equation (17) means that the market share of a group i is equal to its
weight.
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Definition 7. The group i participative constraint corresponds to the bid
surface for which the participative constraint introduced by the inequality
(15) is saturated. This bid surface is denoted CPi and defined implicitly
from the equation:
V
(
h(q, s|βi), CPi
(
q, s|βi, u
(CP )
i
))
= V (0, 0) (18)
Definition 8. The group i incentive constraint with respect to the group j
corresponds to the bid surface of the group i for which its incentive constraint
(16) with respect to the group j is saturated. This bid surface is denoted
CI
kij
ij (q, s|βi, u
(kij )
i ) and defined implicitly from the equation:
V
(
h(q, s|βi), CI
(kij)
ij
(
q, s|βi, u
(kij)
i
))
= V
(
h(q˜, s˜|βi), E
kj
j
(
q˜, s˜|βj , u
(kj )
j
))
,
(q, s) ∈ [Qi−1, Qi]× [Si−1, Si] , (q˜, s˜) ∈ [Qj−1, Qj]× [Sj−1, Sj ] . (19)
2 Existence of hedonic equilibrium
As in the vertical differentiation case (see Baudry and Maslianska¨ıa-Pautrel,
2011a), it is easy to show that the following equilibrium properties are ver-
ified :
Proposition 2. If in equilibrium the individual A from group i buys a
house with housing services level H∗A = h(Q
∗
A, S
∗
A|βi) for the price P
∗
A =
E∗i (H
∗
A|βi, u
∗
i ). Thus:
Pj(H
∗
j ) > E
∗
i (H
∗
j |βi, u
∗
i ), ∀j : βj 6= βi; (20)
PB(H
∗
B) = E
∗
j (H
∗
B|βi, u
∗
i ), ∀B : βB = βA = βi (21)
Proof. The proof is immediate from the definition the bid function and the
fact that the utility function is increasing with respect to its arguments,
which implies an increase in the value of the group’s utility following the
displacement of the group bid surface down.
The proposition means that : i) for a group i, prices of houses purchased
by consumers of other groups can not be located below the equilibrium bid
surface of the group i, and ii) prices of houses puchased by consumers of the
group i belong the same group?s equilibrium bid surface.
For analyzing the existence of hedonic equilibrium and its characteristics,
we proceed in two stages. On the first stage we examine the set of incentive
constraints of groups, on the second one, we examine their participative
constraints. The existence of equilibrium depends on groups preferences
namely on different assumptions Spence-Mirrlees presented above.
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2.1 Incentive constraints
Consider the iso-cost curves of the groups’ bid functions in the space (Q,S).
By definition of the group’s bid function, the housing services level along the
iso-cost curve is constant. Therefore, the iso-cost curves coincide with the
curves of iso-index of the housing services (later called, “ the iso-H curves”).
Given the assumptions about the function H = h(Q,S|β), the iso-H curves
are convex and decreasing in the plane (Q,S) and an increased level of H
moves the iso-H curve upward. Therefore, a iso-H curve of a group, located
higher than an other one corresponds to a higher level of utility, ceteris
paribus.
Proposition 3. At equilibrium, the curves of iso-H are ordered in the plane
(Q,S) in increasing order of β from left to right along the axis of Q.
Proof. The proof is provided in the appendix B.1.
Theorem 1. At equilibrium, only the incentive constraints with respect to
adjacent groups are saturated. 12
Demonstration. The demonstration of this theorem is provided in the ap-
pendix B.2.
Definition 9. The boundary between two groups i and j is the curve of
intersection of the equilibrium groups bid surfaces.
Corollary 1. At equilibrium the hedonic price function is continuous.
Proof. The result follows immediately from the proposition 2 and the theo-
rem 1.
At equilibrium the boundary s = gi,i−1(q) between groups i and i − 1
has the follow property:
Proposition 4. A) Under assumptions (H
′
1) - (H
′
2) the equation of the
boundary between groups i and i− 1 becomes:
q = Qi,i−1,
where Qi,i−1 is the value of the environmental quality on the boundary
between groups i and i−1 when s = 0, and the boundary is the vertical
line parallel to the axis S.
12The result of the theorem 1 can be viewed as symmetric to the result of the Boundary
indifference lemma in the Epple and Platt (1998, p. 28, lemma 1) sorting model, in that
Epple and Platt study the case of a continuous heterogeneity on the demand side and dis-
crete heterogeneity on the supply side, while we study the case of a discrete heterogeneity
on the demand side and a continuous heterogeneity on a supply side
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B) Under assumptions (H
′′
1) - (H
′′
2) the boundary between two groups
s = gi,i−1(q) is an increasing function in q.
Proof. Follows from proposition 1.
To determine equilibrium, we should now to show which group(s) fulfills
its (their) participative constraint(s) at equilibrium.
2.2 Group’s participative constraint and iterative construc-
tion of equilibrium
2.2.1 Case of group identical valuation of “outside the environ-
mental quality” housing
Let study the participative constraints of groups i and j such that βi < βj .
Under (H
′
1) and (H
′
2) conditions, the curve of participative constraints
intersection is a line belonging to the (S,P ) coordinated plan.13
The services level of housing with “outside the environmental quality”
does not depend on the preference parameter β:
h(0, s|βi) = h(0, s|βj) (23)
In this case, the single-crossig condition (H
′
1) involves the in the plan
(Q,P ), for a given level of S, the slopes of the participative constraints of
groups are ordered in increasing order of the preference parameter. Since
all participative constraints cross when Q = 0, the surfaces corresponding
to participative constraints are located one below other, the participative
constraint of the first group being the lowest, and the last group one the
highest:
CP1(q, s) < CP2(q, s) < · · · < CPN (q, s), ∀ (q, s) ∈ [0, Qmax]× [0, Smax] .
(24)
In this case, as in the vertical differentiation case (see Baudry and
Maslianska¨ıa-Pautrel, 2011a), at equilibrium the first group stays on its
participative constraint untill point Q1 (moving along the axis Q according
the proposition 4). The point Q1 is found from the condition of equality
13The fact that the curve of participative constraints intersection belongs to the (S, P )
coordinated plan the name of H
′
assumption: group identical valuation of “outside the
environmental quality” alternative. Indeed, when Q = 0:
CPi
“
0, s|βi, u
(CP )
i
”
= CPj
“
0, s|βj , u
(CP )
j
”
= u¯, (22)
where u¯ is the utility level achieved by all consumers under the H
′
assumptions.
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between the share of supply demanded by the first group and the group’s
weight (see condition (17) of hedonic equilibrium definition):∫ Smax
0
∫ Q1
0
ϕ(q, s) dq ds = η1. (25)
The equilibrium price function for the second group corresponds to its
bid function obtained from the incentive constraint of the group 2 with
respect to the group 1 on the boundary q = Q1, s ∈ [0, Smax] (according the
proposition 4). The boundary between the groups 2 and 3 is defined from:∫ Smax
0
∫ Q2
Q1
ϕ(q, s) dq ds = η2. (26)
or equivalently: ∫ Smax
0
∫ Q2
0
φ(q, s) dq ds = η1 + η2. (27)
Proceeding in the same way, we construct the surface of hedonic price
equilibrium.
Theorem 2. Under the assumptions (H
′
1) and (H
′
2), an equilibrium of
housing market exists and the resulting hedonic price function is implicitly
peace-wise defined by the following equations:
V (h(q, s|β1), E
∗
1(q, s|β1, u
∗
1)) = V (0, 0) (28)
V (h(Qi−1, s|βi), E
∗
i (q, s|βi, u
∗
i ), ) = V (h(q, s|βi), E
∗
i−1(Qi−1, s|βi−1, u
∗
i−1))
(29)∫ Smax
0
∫ Qi
0
ϕ(q, s) dq ds =
i∑
1
ηk (30)
Demonstration. The existence of equilibrium is ensured by the construction
described above. The equations (28 ) - (30) are obtained immediately by
the generalization of the above reasoning.
2.2.2 The case of group specific valuation of “outside the environ-
mental quality” and “outside the intrinsic quality” housing
We turn now to study participative constraints of the groups i and j such
that βi < βj under assumptions (H
′′
1) and (H
′′
2). The curve of intersection
of those participative constraints does not belong to any coordinate plan, and
services levels of housing “outside the environmental quality” and “outside
the intrinsic quality” is specific for each group:
h(0, s|βi) 6= h(0, s|βj) and h(q, 0|βi) 6= h(q, 0|βj) (31)
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Let Fij(q, fij(q)) the line of intersection of surfaces CPi and CPj . It is
defined implicitly by the following equation:
CPi
(
q, fij(q)|βi, u
(CPi)
)
= CPj
(
q, fij(q)|βj , u
(CPj)
)
. (32)
According to the conditions (H
′′
1) and (H
′′
2), at the left of the curve
Fij(q, fij(q)) the participative constraint of the group i is located above the
participative constraint of the group j, and at the left of the intersection
curve the order is reversed:
CPi
(
q, s|βi, u
(CPi)
)
> CPj
(
q, s|βj , u
(CPj )
)
, if s > fij(q) (33)
CPi
(
q, s|βi, u
(CPi)
)
< CPj
(
q, s|βj , u
(CPj )
)
, if s < fij(q) (34)
Proposition 5. Under assumption (H
′′
1) - (H
′′
2) and given the indepen-
dence of the “outside the market” alternative from the preference parameter
β, all participative constraints are crossing in the same curve:
Fij(q, fij(q)) ≡ F (q, f(q)), ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., I}
Proof. The proof of this proposition is provided in the appendix B.4.
The following proposition defines which group saturates its participative
constraint at equilibrium.
Proposition 6. The group i◦ which saturates its participative constraint at
equilibrium can be find from the following condition:
i◦ = min
i∈{1,...,I}
i :
i∑
k=1
ηk ≥ Π(f(q)). (35)
Proof. The proof is provided in the appendix B.5.
At equilibrium, each group i < i◦, saturates its incentive constraint with
respect to the next group passing through the boundary of the group with
the next one. Each group i > i◦, saturates its incentive constraint with
respect to the previous group passing through the boundary of the group
with the previous one. The boundaries can be obtained from condition of
equivalence between distribution of supply and distribution of demand of
the housing services index. The figure 3 shows different configurations for
boundaries between consumers groups.
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Figure 3: Different configurations for consumers groups boundaries
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Theorem 3. Under assumption (H
′′
1) and (H
′′
2), there is an equilibrium on
the housing market for which the hedonic price function corresponds to the
equilibrium groups bid surfaces, E∗i (q, s|βi, u
∗
i ), defined from the following
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equations:
E∗i◦ = CPi◦(q, s|βi◦ , u
∗
i◦), ou` (36)
CPi◦(q, s|βi◦ , u
∗
i◦) : V (h(q, s|βi◦), CPi◦ (q, s|βi◦ , u
∗
i◦)) = V (0, 0),
i◦ = min
i∈{1,...,I}
i :
i∑
k=1
ηk ≥ Π(f(q)),
s = f(q) : CPi◦ (q, f(q)|βi◦ , u
∗
i◦) = CPi
(
q, f(q)|βi, u
(CP )
i
)
, i ∈ {1, ..., I}\{i◦}
(37)
Π(f(q)) =


∫ Smax
0
∫ f−1(s)
0 ϕ(q, s) dq ds, if Smax ≤ Qmax;
∫ f(Qmax)
0
∫ f−1(s)
0 ϕ(q, s) dq ds
+
∫ Smax
f(Qmax)
∫ Qmax
0 ϕ(q, s) dq ds, if Smax > Qmax
(38)
∀ 1 ≤ i < i◦ :
V (h(q, s|βi), E
∗
i (q, s|βi, u
∗
i )) = V
(
h(q, gi,i+1(q)|βi), E
∗
i+1
(
q, gi,i+1(q)|βi+1, u
∗
i+1
))
,
(39)
∀ i◦ < i ≤ I :
V (h(q, s|βl), E
∗
l (q, s|βl, u
∗
l )) = V
(
h(q, gl−1,l(q)|βl), E
∗
l−1
(
q, gl−1,l(q)|βl−1, u
∗
l−1
))
,
(40)
∀i, s = gi,i+1(q) :
E∗i (q, gi,i+1(q)|βi, u
∗
i ) = E
∗
i+1(q, gi,i+1(q)|βi+1, u
(i+1)) (41)
i∑
k=1
Πi(gi,i+1(q)) =
i∑
k=1
ηi, i ∈ {1, ..., I}, where (42)
i∑
k=1
Πi(gi,i+1(q)) =


∫ Smax
Simin
∫ g−1i,i+1(s)
Qimin
ϕ(q, s) dq ds, if Smax ≤ Qmax;
∫ gi,i+1(Qmax)
Simin
∫ g−1i,i+1(s)
Qimin
ϕ(q, s) dq ds
+
∫ Smax
gi,i+1(Qmax)
∫ Qmax
0 ϕ(q, s) dq ds, if Smax > Qmax
(43)
The segments limits are defined from the equations (B.38)-(B.41).
Demonstration. The existence of equilibrium is ensured by the condition
(B.42) of the proposition 6, and by the property of the density function
on the supply side
(∫ Smax
0
∫ Qmax
0 ϕ(q, s)dqds = 1
)
and the distribution of
consumers groups weights on the demand side
(∑N
i=1 ηi = 1
)
.
18
The demonstration of the hedonic price function equations resulting from
the equilibrium is immediate by the construction described above.
2.3 Implicit prices of housing attributes and sorting of the
demand for housing attributes
2.3.1 Case of group identical valuation of “outside the environ-
mental quality” housing
The theorem 2 establishes the existence of equilibrium and its equations
under the single-crossing assumption (H
′
1) and (H
′
2). As in the vertical
differentiation case, the hedonic price function resulting from equilibrium is
defined by segments corresponding to the groups bid surfaces of equilibrium.
Theorem 4. In the presence of a horizontal differentiation of housing, an
consumers heterogeneity by groups of preferences for housing attributes, and
under the assumptions (H
′
1) and (H
′
2), the implicit price of environmental
quality has discontinuities on the boundaries between the segments of the
hedonic price function.
Demonstration. The demonstration of the theorem is provided in the ap-
pendix B.3.
As in the case of vertical differentiation, consumers of the 1st group
(which the lowest parameter of preferences for environmental quality) buy at
equilibrium the housing with minimal level of environmental quality (accord-
ing to the proposition 3), involving a complete sorting of the environmental
quality demand.
2.3.2 Case of group specific valuation of “outside the environ-
mental quality” and “outside the intrinsic quality” housing
Theorem 3 establishes the existence of equilibrium and its equations under
assumptions of single-crossing (H
′′
1) and (H
′′
2). As in the previous case of
group identical “outside the environmental quality” alternative, in the case
of group specific alternatives “outside the one or other housing attributes”,
the equilibrium hedonic price function is piecewise defined, and each segment
corresponds to the equilibrium groups bid surfaces. However, as to the result
about the discontinuity of the marginal hedonic price function, in this case
it becomes:
Theorem 5. In the presence of a horizontal differentiation of housing and
a group-wise buyers heterogeneity of the preferences for housing attributes,
and under the assumptions (H
′′
1) and (H
′′
2), the implicit price of environ-
mental quality and the implicit price of intrinsic attribute have discontinu-
ities on the boundaries between the segments of the hedonic price function.
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Demonstration. The demonstration of this theorem is provided in the ap-
pendix B.6.
However, unlike the previously studied case, it is possible now that sev-
eral groups buy at equilibrium housing with the minimum environmental
quality. In addition, when such situation exists, the participative constraint
of the 1st group is not saturated at equilibrium. The condition of saturation
of the participative constraint is not no longer the condition of the minimum
level of parameter heterogeneity, but the relationship between the weight of
first groups and the market share of the supply available for these groups
to the left of the intersection of groups participative constraints. So this
is not necessarily the group with the parameter of preferences β the lowest
which the sellers extract the entire consumer surplus. This result can affect
the valuation of the change in welfare following a modification of the envi-
ronmental quality of housing, and therefore the environmental cost-benefit
analysis.
Figure 4: Partial sorting of housing attributes demand
β1 β2
β3
S  
Q 
S max
0 Qmax 
A
 
B  
C
QA QC QB
In the case of a horizontal differentiation with group specific “outside the
one or other housing attributes” alternatives (assumptions H
′′
), the market
equilibrium leads to a partial sorting of housing attributes demand by con-
sumers groups. The figure 4 illustrates this point: the consumers A and B
belong to the group with the preference parameter β1 and the consumer C
belongs to the group with the preference parameter β2 (β1 < β2), however,
QA < QC < QB . This result can be consider as dual to the two dimensions
stratification result obtained by Epple and Platt (1998), and concerning the
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income and preference parameter partial stratification at equilibrium of the
sorting model.
3 Numerical application to the case of nested CES direct
utility function
3.1 Case of group identical valuation of “outside the envi-
ronmental quality” housing
The figures 5 and 6 show numerical illustrations done for a nested CES
utility function:
U(h(q, s|βj),X) = [α h(q, s|βj)
σ + (1− α)Xσ ]
1
σ , (44)
h(q, s|βj) = [βjq
σ + sσ]
1
σ , (45)
σ ∈]0, 1[, α ∈ [0, 1[.
For numerical simulations, we use the case of three groups of individuals
according to their preferences parameter β with β1 = 0.1 (low preference for
the environmental quality of housing), β2 = 0.5 (average preference for the
environmental quality of housing), β3 = 0.7 (strong preference for the envi-
ronmental quality of housing). We consider one case of uniform distribution
of the size of consumer groups η1 = η2 = η3 = 0.3(3) and one case where the
group 2 is larger than the other two groups: η1 = 0.2, η2 = 0.6, η3 = 0.2.
Consumers’ income is the average of the log-normal distribution constructed
on data from the Loire estuary area, and equal to 19 900. We chose the pa-
rameters α = 0.4 and σ = 0.7. The joint distribution of housing attributes
is assumed to be uniformly distributed on the intervals [0, 15 000]× [0, 9 000].
Figure 5: Hedonic price function with different relative weights of consumers
groups with heterogeneous preferences
(a) Hedonic price. Identical weights of
consumers groups.
(b) Hedonic price. Different weights of
consumers groups.
The graphs confirm the theoretical results. The hedonic price is the en-
velope surface of the groups’ bid surfaces (figures 5(a) and 5(b)). Differences
in the group weights have an impact on the share of environmental quality
acquired by each group. In the case where the weights are the same, the
share of environmental quality acquired by each group are identical (Figure
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Figure 6: Implicit prices of housing attributes in the case of group identical
“outside the environmental quality” alternative.
(a) Implicit price of the housing environ-
mental quality.
(b) Implicit price of the housing in-
trinsic quality.
5(a)). In the case where the weight of the 2nd group is more important the
environmental quality demanded by this group is also higher (figure 5(b)) .
Figure 6 shows implicit prices of each housing attribute. The implicit price
of environmental quality is a discontinuous function on the borders of the
segments (figure 6(a)). However, the implicit price of intrinsic housing qual-
ity is a continuous function on the domain of possible attributes of housing
(Figure 6(b)).
3.2 Case of group specific valuation of “outside the envi-
ronmental quality” and “outside the intrinsic quality”
housing
As in the previous section, we illustrates the obtained results in making a
numerical simulation with a nested CES direct utility function:
U(h(q, s|βj),X) = [α h(q, s|βj)
σ + (1− α)Xσ ]
1
σ , (46)
h(q, s|βj) = [βjq
σ + (1− βj) s
σ]
1
σ , (47)
σ ∈]0, 1[, α ∈ [0, 1[.
The equilibrium equations in the case of the nested CES utility function
(46) - (47) are obtained in the appendix C. The figure 7 shows the hedonic
price function as well as implicit prices of the housing attributes for the
numerical application.
The simulations are carried for the same parameters of the utility func-
tion and the same consumer income, as in the previous case: α = 0.4,
σ = 0.7 and R= 19 900. The preference parameters of the three groups are
also identical to the previous case ones: β1 = 0.1, β2 = 0.5, β3 = 0.7. The
groups weights are respectively: η1 = 0, 17, η2 = 0, 74, η3 = 0, 09. the joint
distribution of housing attributes is supposed uniform distribution on the
intervals [0, 1 000] × [0, 1 500].
The hedonic price is the envelope surface of groups’ bid surfaces (graph
7(a)), but this is participative constraint of the 2nd group is saturated. The
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Figure 7: Hedonic price function and implicit prices under assumption H
′′
.
Application for a nested CES function
(a) Hedonic price function.
S
Q0
(b) Boundaries between groups (projec-
tion).
S
Q
P
0
(c) Implicit price of the environmental
quality.
S
Q
P
(d) Implicit price of the intrinsic at-
tribute.
graph 7(b) represents the boundaries between consumer groups in the plane
(Q,S). The implicit price of environmental quality and the intrinsic at-
tribute are discontinuous on the boundaries of the segments (graphs 7(c)
and 7(d)).
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4 Conclusion
The theoretical model developed in this paper shows how group-wise het-
erogeneity on the demand side influence the equilibrium of housing mar-
ket with horizontal differentiated supply and the formation of the hedonic
price function. It complete the hedonic segmentation analysis of Baudry
and Maslianska¨ıa-Pautrel (2011a, b) for vertical differentiation of housing
supply by investigating the more realistic case of horizontal differentiation.
So both models appear as a third type of modeling underlying hedonic en-
vironmental assessment besides the “ traditional” hedonic model of Rosen
(1974) and “new” hedonic or sorting models, developed among others, by
Epple and Platt (1998); Epple and Sieg (1999); Kuminoff (2009). While the
first considers the formation of an equilibrium in the market for differenti-
ated products by assuming a continuous heterogeneity on the demand side
and a continuous distribution on the supply side, and the latter examines
the allocation of a continuum individuals with a continuous heterogeneity
between a discrete number of communities (each characterized by an ho-
mogeneous amenities provision and housing prices in the same community),
our model examines the implications of (discrete) heterogeneity by consumer
groups in the presence of a continuous distribution on the supply side.
Following Baudry and Maslianska¨ıa-Pautrel (2011a,b), we based on the
theoretical framework of Rosen model assuming that the supply side distri-
butions of two housing attributes (environmental quality and intrinsic qual-
ity) are fixed. This assumption is consistent with the short-term assumption
observed in empirical hedonic models. Each house is characterized by a level
of housing services that aggregates the two housing attributes. Contrarily
to Baudry and Maslianska¨ıa-Pautrel (2011a,b), there is an horizontal differ-
entiation of housing that is the aggregate function differs from one consumer
group to another. The nature of horizontal differentiation changes depend-
ing on whether the consumers value the same way or not the alternatives
“outside the environmental quality” and “outside the intrinsic quality”. We
studied in this paper the two following configurations: group identical al-
ternative “outside the environmental quality” and group specific for each
alternatives.
Our main results are threefold. First, we confirm the Baudry and Maslian-
ska¨ıa -Pautrel (2011a, b) result that the group-wise consumers heterogeneity
leads to a segmentation of the hedonic price function in the housing mar-
ket equilibrium. Hedonic price function is continuous, but build of different
segments corresponding to each consumer group. As well as in the vertical
differentiation case, this result has two major implications for the “usual”
estimation procedure developed from the model of Rosen. On the one hand,
the hedonic price function we obtain, based on individual characteristics,
while in the “usual” procedure, individual characteristics appear only on
the second stage, once the hedonic price function estimated. On the other
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hand, the segmentation of the hedonic price function implies a discontinuity
of the implicit price of environmental quality of housing on the borders of
the segments, which invalidates the second stage of the procedure where the
implicit price function is assumed continuous.
Our second results concern sorting of the consumers demand. We demon-
strate that the identical valuation of the “out of environmental quality” al-
ternative leads, as in the vertical differentiation case, to complete sorting of
the demand for the housing environmental attribute. However, in the case
of group specific valuation of housing without environmental or intrinsic
quality, the segmentation of hedonic price function leads to partial sorting
of the demand for housing attributes by consumers groups. This result can
be viewed as dual to the partial two-dementional stratification by consumer
income and preferences in sorting models (Epple and Platt, 1998).
Finally, our third result deals with consumers surplus extraction in equi-
librium. Fixed supply and short-run assumption lead to sellers of a part
of housing, extract at equilibrium, the all consumer surplus of one or more
groups. We show that in the case of group specific valuation of housing
without environmental or intrinsic quality, the group with the lowest pa-
rameter for environmental quality is not necessarily the one with the whole
surplus extracted. In the case of group identical valuation, as in the vertical
differentiation case, the whole surplus is extracted from the first consumers
group that is with the lowest preference parameter. Thus the segmentation
have implications for the assessment of welfare related to changes in environ-
mental quality, and thus for the cost-benefice environmental analysis. The
study of these implications constitutes one of the future research.
This article calls for more investigations.
From the theoretical point of view, it could be interesting to study a
mixed case with consumers continuous heterogeneity in income and group-
wise heterogeneity by housing attributes preferences. This would remove the
strong assumption of equality of income among individuals in the presence
of an horizontal differentiation of housing.
From the empirical point of view, this paper develops the basic modeling
on which econometric methods alternative to the “usual” two stage proce-
dure should be based for correctly deal with aspects of the housing market
segmentation.
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Appendices
A Three approaches of the hedonic theory
Figure 8: Three approaches of the hedonic theory
"Traditional" Hedonic Approche
(Rosen, 1974)
- Consumers: 
  continuous heterogeneity
- Environmental quality: 
  discrete heterogeneity
"New" HedonicApproche 
(sorting models)
(Epple and Platt, 1998; Kumino!, 2009; ...)
- Consumers: 
  continuous heterogeneity
- Environmental quality: 
  continuous heterogeneity
- Consumers: 
  discrete heterogeneity
- Environmental quality: 
  continuous heterogeneity
- Hedonic Price Funcion: 
 depends on individual 
 characteristics
-  Implicit Price of environmental 
quality:   discontinuous
- Sorting of consumers with respect to 
environmental quality: 
 partial / complete according to  
the housing supply differentiation and 
hypotheses about consumers preferences
- Hedonic Price Function: 
   does not depend on 
              individual characteristics
- Implicit Price of environmental 
quality:    continuous
- Sorting of consumers with respect to
environmental quality: 
 partial under some specifications 
 of the utility function
Segmentation Hedonic Model
(Baudry and Maslianskaïa-Pautrel, 2011a, b; this paper)
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B Proofs and demonstrations
B.1 Proof of the proposition 3
Let two iso-H curves on the plan (Q,S), corresponding to the same housing
services level h˜, of groups i and j such that βi < βj :
s = s˜i(q|βi) : h(q, s˜i(q|βi)|βi) = h˜; (B.1)
s = s˜j(q|βj) : h(q, s˜j(q|βj)|βj) = h˜. (B.2)
Let (q∗, s∗) the intersection point of s˜i and s˜j .
We assume that at equilibrium there exists (q
′
i, s
′
i) ∈ s˜i(·) et (q
′
j , s
′
j) ∈
s˜j(·) such that: 

q
′
j < q
∗ < q
′
i
s
′
j > s
∗ > s
′
i
(B.3)
This condition means that the iso-H curve of the group with higher level of
β is located on the left of the iso-H curve of the group with lower level of β.
Since βi < βj , it follows that s
′
j = s˜j(q
′
j|βj) > s˜i(q
′
i|βi)
.
= s
′′
i . Conse-
quently, the point (q
′
j , s
′
j) is located above the iso-H curve s˜i(·) of the group
i. It means that individuals of the group i could achieve a higher utility level
if they are located on the iso-H curve passing through the point (q
′
j, s
′
j) (the
iso-H curves of both groups correspond to the same price level). The incen-
tive constraint is not satisfied and thus the condition (B.3) is not satistied
at equilibrium.
Consequently, at equilibrium the iso-H curves are ordering in the plan
(Q,S) in increasing order of β, from left to the right along the axis Q.
Q.E.D.
B.2 Demonstration of the theorem 1
1°. The saturation of incentive constraints with respect to the adjacent
groups follows immediately from the proposition 3. Indeed, suppose that at
equilibrium{
(Q¯∗i,i+1, S¯
∗
i,i+1)
}
=
{
(q, s) :
(
h(q, s|βi) = H¯
)
&
(
E∗i (H¯|βi, u
∗
i ) = P
∗(H¯)
)}
⋂{
(q, s) :
(
h(q, s|βi+1) = H¯
)
&
(
E∗i+1(H¯|βi+1, u
∗
i+1) = P
∗(H¯)
)}
(B.4)
(Q¯∗i,i+1, S¯
∗
i,i+1) is the intersection point of the iso-H equilibrium curves of the
groups i and i+ 1, corresponding to a housing services level H¯.
So, h(Q¯∗i,i+1, S¯
∗
i,i+1)|βi) = h(Q¯
∗
i,i+1, S¯
∗
i,i+1|βi+1) and
Ei(Q¯
∗
i,i+1, S¯
∗
i,i+1|βi, u
∗
i ) = Ei+1(Q¯
∗
i,i+1, S¯
∗
i,i+1|βi+1, u
∗
i+1).
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Consequently
V (h(Q¯∗i,i+1, S¯
∗
i,i+1)|βi), Ei(Q¯
∗
i,i+1, S¯
∗
i,i+1|βi, u
∗
i ))
=V (h(Q¯∗i,i+1, S¯
∗
i,i+1)|βi), Ei+1(Q¯
∗
i,i+1, S¯
∗
i,i+1|βi+1, u
∗
i+1)), (B.5)
and
V (h(Q¯∗i,i+1, S¯
∗
i,i+1)|βi+1), Ei+1(Q¯
∗
i,i+1, S¯
∗
i,i+1|βi+1, u
∗
i+1))
=V (h(Q¯∗i,i+1, S¯
∗
i,i+1)|βi+1), Ei(Q¯
∗
i,i+1, S¯
∗
i,i+1|βi, u
∗
i )), (B.6)
from which (Q¯∗i,i+1, S¯
∗
i,i+1) ∈ CI
ki,i+1
i,i+1 and (Q¯
∗
i,i+1, S¯
∗
i,i+1) ∈ CI
kij
i+1,i, so CI
ki+1,i
i,i+1 ≡
E∗i+1 (the incentive constraint of the group i with respect to the group i+1
and the incentive constraint of the group i + 1 with respect to the group i
are equilibrium bid surfaces of the groups i and i+ 1 respectively).
2°. The incentive constraint of the group i with respect to a group j such
that: j 6= i+1, j 6= i1 could not be saturated at equilibrium because, if they
are, the iso-H curves of the groups between i and j do not be monotone.
1° and 2° demonstrate the theorem 1.
B.3 Demonstration of the theorem 4
Let study the part of the hedonic price surface corresponding to a group’s
i equilibrium bid function. By definition 2 of individual bid function, the
equilibrium prices for the group i satisfy:
V (h(q, s), P ∗(q, s)) = u∗i , (q, s) ∈ Dhi (B.7)
where u∗i is equilibrium reference utility of the group i, and Dhi is its defi-
nition domain equal to [Qi−1, Qi]× [0, Smax].
1°. The partial derivative of (B.7) with respect to Q, gives:
∂V
∂h
∂h
∂Q
+
∂V
∂P
∂P
∂Q
= 0, (B.8)
from what
∂P
∂Q
∣∣∣
(q,s)∈Dhi
= −
∂V/∂h ∂h/∂Q
∂V/∂P
∣∣∣
(q,s)∈Dhi
. (B.9)
The equation (B.9) is verified for each group i ∈ {1, ..., I}.
Let study two adjacent groups i and i+1. The Spence-Mirrlees condition
(H
′
1), involves: ∂
∂β
(
∂P
∂Q
)
> 0, for all S and β. Consequently:
∂P ∗i
∂Q
∣∣∣
q=Qi
<
∂P ∗i+1
∂Q
∣∣∣
q=Qi
, (B.10)
since βi < βi+1.
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The discontinuity of the implicit price of environmental quality on the
boundaries of segments, is thus proven.
2°. The partial derivative of (B.7) with respect to S, give, for each group
i ∈ {1, ..., I}:
∂P
∂S
∣∣∣
(q,s)∈Dhi
= −
∂V/∂h ∂h/∂S
∂V/∂P
∣∣∣
(q,s)∈Dhi
. (B.11)
The Spence-Mirrlees condition (H
′
2), involves that: ∂
∂β
(
∂P
∂S
)
= 0, for all
Q and β. Consequently:
∂P ∗i
∂S
∣∣∣
q=Qi
=
∂P ∗i+1
∂S
∣∣∣
q=Qi
, ∀i. (B.12)
The implicit price of the intrinsic quality is continuous on all definition
domain [0, Qmax]× [0, Smax].
1° and 2° demonstrate the theorem 4.
B.4 Proof of the proposition 5
Let study the participative constraints of three groups i1 < i2 < i3: CPi1 =
Ei1(s, q|βi1 , u
(CPi1 )), CPi2 = Ei2(s, q|βi2 , u
(CPi2 )), CPi3 = Ei3(s, q|βi3 , u
(CPi3 )).
Since the “outside the market” alternative does not depend on the parame-
ter β, and by definition of the participative constraint we obtain: u(CPi1 ) =
u(CPi2 ) = u(CPi3 ) = U(R, 0)
.
= u0.
We adopt the following notations:
s = f12(q) for the intersection curve between the surfaces CPi1 and
CPi2 ;
s = f23(q) for the intersection curve between the surfaces CPi2 and
CPi3 ;
s = f13(q) for the intersection curve between the surfaces CPi1 and
CPi2 .
By definition of the participative constraint
CPi1(q, f12(q)|βi1 , u
0) = CPi2(q, f12(q)|βi2 , u
0) = F12(q, f12(q)) (B.13)
CPi2(q, f23(q)|βi2 , u
0) = CPi3(q, f23(q)|βi3 , u
0) = F23(q, f23(q)) (B.14)
CPi1(q, f12(q)|βi1 , u
0) = CPi3(q, f13(q)|βi3 , u
0) = F13(q, f13(q)) (B.15)
The single-crossing condition and the monotony of the boundary between
two groups involve the either the curves f12(q), f23(q), f13(q) are similar, or
each pair of curves has only one intersection point.
By definition of the “outside the market” alternative and of the partici-
pative constraint:
f12(0) = f23(0) = f13(0) = 0
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Consequently, if the curves do not coincide they cross each other in the same
point (0, 0).
Let f12(q) 6= f23(q) 6= f13(q), if q 6= 0. We first suppose that:
f12(q˜) < f23(q˜) < f13(q˜), ∀q˜ > 0. (B.16)
We adopt the following notation for a given level of q (q = q˜):
s˜12 = f12(q˜);
s˜23 = f23(q˜);
s˜13 = f13(q˜).
1°. By replacing the point (q˜, s˜12) into (B.13), we obtain:
CPi1(q˜, s˜12|βi1 , u
0) = CPi2(q˜, s˜12|βi2 , u
0) = F12(q˜, s˜12)
.
= F˜12 (B.17)
We use also the notation h˜12 for the level of H corresponding to iso-
H curves of groups i1 and i2, which cross each other in the point (q˜, s˜12).
Follow (B.17), the price corresponding to the iso-H curve h˜12 is F˜12. Given
the proof of the proposition 3 (see Appendix B.1), the iso-H curve of the
group i1 is located to the left of the iso-H curve of the groups i2.
Let (q
′
223, s
′
223) the intersection point of the iso-H curve of the group i2
(hi2(q, s|βi2) = h˜12) and of the intersection curve of groups i2 and i3 partic-
ipative constraints (s = f23(q)).
Ei2(q
′
223, s
′
223) = F˜12,
because of the iso-H curve of the group i2 corresponding to iso-price F˜12.
We study now the iso-H curve of the group i3, passing through the point
(q
′
223, s
′
223). As this point belongs to the intersection curve of the groups i2
and i3 participative constraints, it follows that:
Ei3(q
′
223, s
′
223) = Ei3(q
′
223, s
′
223) = F˜12
(B.18)
As f23(q) > f12(q), ∀q > 0, the iso-H curve of the group i2 is located on
the right of the curve f23(q), what is contrary to the proof of the proposition
3. Thus we obtain that
f23(q) < f12(q), ∀q > 0. (B.19)
2°. We study now the point (q˜, s˜23).
By replacing it to the (B.14), we obtain:
CPi2(q˜, s˜23|βi2 , u
0) = CPi3(q˜, s˜23|βi3 , u
0) = F23(q˜, s˜23)
.
= F˜23 (B.20)
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Let (q
′
212, s
′
212) the intersection point of the iso-H curve of the group i2
corresponding to the price level F˜23, and of the intersection curve of the
groups i1 and i2 participative constraints, f˜12. Thus,
CPi2(q
′
212, s
′
212) = F˜23 (B.21)
Let (q
′
312, s
′
312) the intersection point of the iso-H curve of the group i3
corresponding to the price level F˜23, and of the intersection curve of the
groups i1 and i2 participative constraints, f˜12. So, we obtain for the iso-H
curve of the group i2 passing through the point (q
′
312, s
′
312)
CPi2(q
′
312, s
′
312) = CPi3(q
′
312, s
′
312) = F˜23 (B.22)
The conditions (B.21) and (B.22) mean that
CPi2(q
′
212, s
′
212) = CPi2(q
′
312, s
′
312)
or equivalently
f12(q
′
212) = f12q
′
312,
what is contrary to the strict monotony of the function s = f12(q).
Finally we obtain that intersection curve f12(q) coincide with the inter-
section curve f23(q), ∀q > 0.
By proceeding in the same way we obtain f12(q) = f13(q), and thus all
participative constraints have the same intersection curve. Q.E.D.
B.5 Demonstration of the proposition 6
Let study the 1st group. According to the relationship between group’s
weight, η1, and the market share available for this group to the left of the
curve F (q, f(q)), called Π(f(q)), two cases are possible:
Case (a): Π(f(q)) ≤ η1, (B.23)
Case (b): Π(f(q)) > η1, (B.24)
where the share Π(f(q)) is defined according to the intersection curve s =
f(q) achieves the maximum level of S inside or outside the domain of the
variable Q (see graphics of the figure 9):
Π(f(q)) =


∫ Smax
0
∫ f−1(s)
0 ϕ(q, s) dq ds, si Smax ≤ Qmax;
∫ f(Qmax)
0
∫ f−1(s)
0 ϕ(q, s) dq ds+
+
∫ Smax
f(Qmax)
∫ Qmax
0 ϕ(q, s) dq ds, si Smax > Qmax
(B.25)
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Figure 9: Two cases for market share Π(f(q)) calculus
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Case (a). The market share Π(f(q)) is lower that the 1st group’s
weight
The condition (B.23) involves that consumers of the 1st group are located at
equilibrium on their participative constraint CP1. According to (B.23) and
(17) the boundary between the group 1 and the group 2 is located to the right
of the curve of intersection of participatory constraints, i.e. where groups’
participative constraints are ordered in increasing order of the parameter β.
In this case, if at equilibrium the individuals of the 1st group are on their
participative constraint, consumers in other groups can not even consider
the purchase of goods purchased by the consumers of the 1st group on the
left of the intersection because their participative constraints are below that
the one of the 1st group. The boundary between groups 1 and 2 of plan
(Q,S) is defined using the following equation:14∫ S1max
0
∫ g−112 (s)
0
ϕ(q, s) dq ds = η1. (B.26)
Proceeding in the same way as in the case of assumption (H
′
1) and
(H
′
2), (where the intersection of participative constraints belongs to the
plane of coordinates (S,P ))we obtain that at equilibrium, consumers of
groups 2, 3, ..., N are located on the incentive constraints of their group with
respect to the previous group and the boundary s = gi−1,i(q) between two
groups i and i− 1 is defined implicitly from the equation:
i−1∑
k=1
Πk(gk,k+1(q)) =
i−1∑
k=1
ηk, i ≥ 2; (B.27)
14If the condition (B.23) is an equality, it means that at equilibrium the group 2 partici-
pative constraint is also saturated, and starting from the group 3 the incentive constraints
with the previous group are saturated.
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where the sum of the market shares
∑i−1
k=1 Πk(gk,k+1(q)) is defined according
to the disposition of the boundary between two groups s = gi−1,i(q) with
respect to variables Q and S domains (see the graphs of the figure 10):
i−1∑
k=1
Πk(gk,k+1(q)) =


∫ Smax
Si−1min
∫ g−1i−1,i(s)
Qi−1min
ϕ(q, s) dq ds, si Smax ≤ Qmax,
∫ gi−1,i(Qmax)
Si−1min
∫ g−1i−1,i(s)
Qi−1min
ϕ(q, s) dq ds
+
∫ Smax
gi−1,i(Qmax)
∫ Qmax
0 ϕ(q, s) dq ds, si Smax > Qmax;
(B.28)
ou`
{
Si−1min = gi−1,i(0),
Qi−1min = 0,
si gi−1,i(0) ≥ 0, et
{
Si−1min = 0,
Qi−1min = g
−1
i−1,i(0),
si g−1i−1,i(0) ≥ 0.
(B.29)
Figure 10: Calculus of
∑i−1
k=1 Πk(gk,k+1(q))
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Case (b). The market share Π(f(q)) is higher than the 1st group
weight
The condition (B.24) implies that at equilibrium, consumers of the first
group can not be situated on their constraint participative CP1. Indeed,
if they could, the boundary between the groups 1 and 2 would be located
to the left of the intersection curve F (q, f(q)), where groups’ participative
constraints are ordered by inverse order of preference parameters β. Thus
the surface CP1 would be above the surface CP2 on the corresponding points
on the frontier between the two groups. The consumers of the group 2 can
not be located above the surface CP2, so if the situation described above is
an equilibrium, then the prices of homes purchased by the group 2 would be
located below the equilibrium bid surface of the group 1, which is contrary
to the proposition 2.
In contrast, consumers of the group 2 may be located on their constraint
participative CP2 at equilibrium, subject to the boundary between groups
2 and 3 located to the right of the intersection of participative constraints:
η1 + η2 ≥ Π(f(q)) (B.30)
Π(f(q)) =


∫ Smax
0
∫ f−1(s)
0 ϕ(q, s) dq ds, if Smax ≤ Qmax;
∫ f(Qmax)
0
∫ f−1(s)
0 ϕ(q, s) dq ds +
∫ Smax
f(Qmax)
∫ Qmax
0 ϕ(q, s) dq ds, if Smax > Qmax
(B.31)
In this case, the consumers of the group 1 are located at equilibrium on the
bid surface which is the incentive constraint of the group 1 with respect to
group 2, passing through the boundary between the groups 1 and 2. The
function of hedonic price equilibrium for the groups 3, 4,..., I, is defined as
in the case (a): on the basis of incentive constraints of the group relative to
the previous group, passing through boundary between the groups.
Let s = g12(q) the equilibrium boundary between the groups 1 and 2
(projection on the plan (Q,S)), s = g23(q) the equilibrium boundary be-
tween the groups 2 and 3,..., s = g(i, i + 1) the equilibrium boundary be-
tween the groups i and i + 1. So the equilibrium hedonic price function is
composed on segments E∗1 , E
∗
2 , E
∗
3 , ..., E
∗
N , such that the following equations
are satisfied:
E∗2 = CP2(q, s|β2, u
∗
2), (B.32)
V (h(q, s|β1), E
∗
1 (q, s|β1, u
∗
1)) = V (h(q, g12(q)|β1), E
∗
2 (q, g12(q)|β2, u
∗
2))
(B.33)
V (h(q, s|βi), E
∗
i (q, s(q)|βi, u
∗
i ))
=V
(
h(q, gi−1,i(q)|βi), E
∗
i−1
(
q, gi−1,i(q)|βi−1, u
∗
i−1
))
, i ∈ {3, ..., I} (B.34)
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∀ i ∈ {1, ..., I − 1} :
s = gi,i+1(q) : E
∗
i (q, gi,i+1|βi, u
∗
i ) = E
∗
i+1(q, gi,i+1|βi+1, u
i+1), (B.35)
i∑
k=1
Πi(gi,i+1(q)) =
i∑
k=1
ηi, i ∈ {1, ..., I} (B.36)
i∑
k=1
Πi(gi,i+1(q)) =


∫ Smax
Simin
∫ g−1i,i+1(s)
Qimin
ϕ(q, s) dq ds, si Smax ≤ Qmax;
∫ gi,i+1(Qmax)
Simin
∫ g−1i,i+1(s)
Qimin
ϕ(q, s) dq ds
+
∫ Smax
gi,i+1(Qmax)
∫ Qmax
0 ϕ(q, s) dq ds, si Smax > Qmax
(B.37)
The segments limits are defined according to the disposition of bound-
aries on the left and on the right of each segment (see Figure 3 which il-
lustrates different possible configurations). Thus, on each interior segment,
∀ 1 < i < I, q ∈
[
Qimin, Q
i
max
]
, s ∈
[
Simin, S
i
max
]
:
Qimin =
[
0, if gi−1,i(0) ≥ 0,
g−1i−1,i(0), if g
−1
i−1,i(0) ≥ 0;
Qimax =
[
g−1i,i+1(Smax), if gi,i+1(Qmax) ≥ Smax,
Qmax, if gi,i+1(Qmax) < Smax.
(B.38)
Simin =
[
gi,i+1(0), if gi,i+1(0) ≥ 0,
0, si g−1i,i+1(0) ≥ 0;
Simax =
[
Smax, if gi−1,i(Qmax) ≥ Smax,
gi−1,i(Qmax), if gi−1,i(Qmax) < Smax.
(B.39)
For the first segment, i = 1, q ∈
[
0, Q1max
]
, s ∈
[
S1min, Smax
]
:
Q1max =
[
g−11,2(Smax), if g1,2(Qmax) ≥ Smax,
Qmax, if g1,2(Qmax) < Smax.
S1min =
[
g1,2(0), if g1,2(0) ≥ 0,
0, if g−11,2(0) ≥ 0;
(B.40)
For the last segment, i = I, q ∈
[
QNmin, Qmax
]
, s ∈
[
0, SNmax
]
:
QNmin =
[
g−1N−1,N (0), if g
0
N−1,N (0) ≥ 0,
0, if gN−1,N (0) ≥ 0.
SNmax =
[
Smax, if gN−1,N (Qmax) ≥ Smax,
gN−1,N (Qmax), if gN−1,N (Qmax) < Smax;
(B.41)
Recall the condition (B.30) necessary for the equilibrium described above:
η1 + η2 ≥ Π(f(q)),
where Π(f(q)) =


∫ Smax
0
∫ f−1(s)
0 ϕ(q, s) dq ds, if Smax ≤ Qmax;∫ f(Qmax)
0
∫ f−1(s)
0 ϕ(q, s) dq ds+∫ Smax
f(Qmax)
∫ Qmax
0 ϕ(q, s) dq ds, if Smax > Qmax
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This condition can be generalized for all groups and finally we obtain:
the group i◦ which saturates its participative constraint at equilibrium can
be find from the following condition:
i◦ = min
i∈{1,...,I}
i :
i∑
k=1
ηk ≥ Π(f(q)). (B.42)
Q.E.D.
B.6 Demonstration of the theorem 5
We proceed in the same was as for the demonstration of the theorem 4 from
the Appendix B.3.
We first study the part of the hedonic price surface corresponding to a
group i equilibrium bid funciton. By the definition 2 of the individual bid
function, the equilibrium prices for the group i satisfy:
V (h(q, s), P ∗(q, s)) = u∗i , (q, s) ∈ Dhi (B.43)
where u∗i is equilibrium reference utility of the group i, and Dhi is its defi-
nition domain equal to [Qmini , Q
max
i ]× [S
min
i , S
max
i ].
The partial derivative of (B.43) with respect to Q, and with respect to
S, give:
∂P
∂Q
∣∣∣
(q,s)∈Dhi
= −
∂V/∂h ∂h/∂Q
∂V/∂P
∣∣∣
(q,s)∈Dhi
, (B.44)
∂P
∂S
∣∣∣
(q,s)∈Dhi
= −
∂V/∂h ∂h/∂S
∂V/∂P
∣∣∣
(q,s)∈Dhi
. (B.45)
The equations (B.44) and (B.45) are verified for each group i ∈ {1, ..., I}.
We now study two adjacent groups i and i + 1. The Spence-Mirrlees
conditions (H
′′
1) and (H
′′
2), involve that:
∂
∂β
(
∂P
∂Q
)
> 0, ∀S, ∀β, (B.46)
∂
∂β
(
∂P
∂S
)
< 0, ∀Q, ∀β. (B.47)
Consequently:
∂P ∗i
∂Q
∣∣∣
q=Qmaxi ,s=gi,i+1(q)
<
∂P ∗i+1
∂Q
∣∣∣
q=Qmaxi ,s=gi,i+1(q)
, (B.48)
∂P ∗i
∂S
∣∣∣
q=Qmaxi ,s=gi,i+1(q)
>
∂P ∗i+1
∂S
∣∣∣
q=Qmaxi ,s=gi,i+1(q)
, (B.49)
car βi < βi+1.
The inequalities (B.48) and (B.49) involve the discontinuity of implicit
prices of housing environmental quality and of housing intrinsic quality on
the boundaries of the segments. Q.E.D.
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C Application to a nested CES direct utility function
In the case of a nested CES direct utility function the equation of the satu-
ration of the group i participative constraint, CPi, becomes:
[α (βiq
σ + (1− βi)s
σ) + (1− α)(R − CPi(q, s))
σ ]
1
σ = (1− α)
1
σR (C.1)
CPi(q, s) = R−
[
Rσ −
α
1− α
(βiq
σ + (1− βi)s
σ)
] 1
σ
(C.2)
The solution of the equation CPi(q, s) = CPj(q, s) provides the equation of
the intersection curve of participative constraints CPi(q, s) and CPj(q, s):
s = q. (C.3)
According to the theoretical result, the intersection function is increasing in
q and does not depend on the β.
The group i equilibrium bid function for the nested CES specification
case is written:
E∗i (q, s|βi, u
∗
i ) = R−
[ 1
1− α
(u∗i )
σ −
α
1− α
(βiq
σ + (1− βi)s
σ)
] 1
σ
, (C.4)
where u∗i is the reference utility level in the bid function definition.
According to the proposition 6, the group for which the participative
constraint is saturated, is obtained from:
i◦∑
k=1
ηk ≥ Π(f(q)), (C.5)
where
Π(f(q)) =


∫ Smax
0
∫ f−1(s)
0 ϕ(q, s) dq ds, if Smax ≤ Qmax;
∫ f(Qmax)
0
∫ f−1(s)
0 ϕ(q, s) dq ds
+
∫ Smax
f(Qmax)
∫ Qmax
0 ϕ(q, s) dq ds, if Smax > Qmax.
(C.6)
In the case of an uniform joint density function and by replacing f−1(s)
by the equation (C.3), the condition is written:
i◦∑
k=1
ηk ≥


Smax
2 Qmax
, if Smax ≤ Qmax;
1 − Qmax2 Smax , if Smax > Qmax
(C.7)
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One defined the group i◦ which saturates its participative constraint, the
hedonic price function corresponds on the interval
[
Qi
◦
min, Q
i◦
max
]
×
[
Si
◦
min, S
i◦
max
]
to the participative constraint of this group:
P ∗i◦ = E
∗
i◦ = CPi◦ = R−
[
Rσ −
α
1− α
(βi◦q
σ + (1− βi◦)s
σ)
] 1
σ
, (C.8)
q ∈
[
Qi
◦
min, Q
i◦
max
]
, s ∈
[
Si
◦
min, S
i◦
max
]
,
where the segment limits are defined from the equations (B.38)-(B.41).
At equilibrium according to the theorem 3, for the consumers of groups
i, such that i < i◦, the hedonic price function corresponds to their incentive
constraints with respect to the next group, passing through the boundary
with the next group. The equation of the boundary, s = gi,i+1(q) is obtained
from the equation (41):
(u∗i )
σ − α (βiq
σ + (1− βi)s
σ) = (u∗i+1)
σ − α (βi+1q
σ + (1− βi+1)s
σ) ;
(C.9)
s =
(
qσ −
(u∗i+1)
σ − (u∗i )
σ
α(βi+1 − βi)
) 1
σ
(C.10)
and the incentive constraint of the group i with respect to the group i + 1
(equation (39) of the theorem 3) becomes in this case:
[α (βiq
σ + (1− βi)s
σ) + (1− α)(R − Ei(q, s|βi, u
∗
i ))
σ]
1
σ
=
[
α (βiq˜
σ + (1− βi)s˜
σ) + (1− α)(R − Ei+1(q˜, s˜|βi+1, u
∗
i+1))
σ
] 1
σ , (C.11)
s˜ = gi,i+1(q˜) =
(
q˜σ −
(u∗i+1)
σ − (u∗i )
σ
α(βi+1 − βi)
) 1
σ
from which
Ei(q, s) = R−
[ (
R− Ei+1(q˜, s˜|βi+1, u
∗
i+1)
)σ
−
α
1− α
(
β qσ + (1− βi)s
σ + q˜σ + (1− βi)
(u∗i )
σ − (u∗i+1)
σ
α(βi+1 − βi)
)] 1
σ
. (C.12)
For the consumers of groups i > i◦ the equilibrium housing price cor-
responds to their incentive constraints with respect to the previous group.
The equation of the boundary is written in this case:
s =
(
qσ −
(u∗i )
σ − (u∗i−1)
σ
α(βi − βi−1)
) 1
σ
(C.13)
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and the incentive constraint (equation 40 of the theorem 3) becomes:
[α (βiq
σ + (1− βi)s
σ) + (1− α)(R − Ei(q, s|βi, u
∗
i ))
σ ]
1
σ
=
[
α (βiq˜
σ + (1− βi)s˜
σ) + (1− α)(R − Ei−1(q˜, s˜|βi−1, u
∗
i−1))
σ
] 1
σ , (C.14)
s˜ = gi,i−1(q˜) =
(
q˜σ −
(u∗i )
σ − (u∗i−1)
σ
α(βi − βi−1)
) 1
σ
for which
Ei(q, s) = R−
[ (
R− Ei−1(q˜, s˜|βi−1, u
∗
i−1)
)σ
−
α
1− α
(
βi q
σ + (1− βi)s
σ + q˜σ − (1− βi)
(u∗i )
σ − (u∗i− 1)σ
α(βi − βi−1)
)] 1
σ
.
(C.15)
The reference utility levels {u∗i }
N
i=1 are obtained from the conditions (42)-
(43) of the equality of market share of a group and its weight (cf. 43). In
the case of the nested CES utility function and joint uniform density these
conditions are written as:
i∑
k=1
ηk =


∫ Smax
Simin
∫ g−1i,i+1(s)
Qimin
ϕ(q, s) dq ds, if Smax ≤ Qmax;
∫ gi,i+1(Qmax)
Simin
∫ g−1i,i+1(s)
Qimin
ϕ(q, s) dq ds
+
∫ Smax
gi,i+1(Qmax)
∫ Qmax
0 ϕ(q, s) dq ds, if Smax > Qmax,
i ∈ {1, ..., I} (C.16)
s = gi,i+1(q) =
(
qσ −
(u∗i+1)
σ − (u∗i )
σ
α(βi+1 − βi)
) 1
σ
(C.17)
ϕ(q, s) =
1
Smax Qmax
(C.18)
Qimin =

 0, si gi,i+1(0) ≥ 0,
g−1i,i+1(0), if g
−1
i,i+1(0) ≥ 0;
(C.19)
Simin =

 gi,i+1(0), if gi,i+1(0) ≥ 0,
0, si g−1i,i+1(0) ≥ 0;
(C.20)
By construction of the equilibrium, u∗i < u
∗
i+1, if i
◦ < i ≤ I − 1, and
u∗i > u
∗
i+1, if 1 ≤ i < i
◦. Consequently:
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A. For the groups i◦ < i ≤ I − 1 (on the right of the group saturates its
participative constraint), g−1i,i+1(0) =
(
(u∗i+1)
σ−(u∗i )
σ
α(βi+1−βi)
) 1
σ
> 0, so the expression
(C.16) becomes :
A.1. If Smax ≤ Qmax
i∑
k=1
ηk =
1
Smax Qmax
∫ Smax
0
(
sσ +
(u∗i+1)
σ − (u∗i )
σ
α(βi+1 − βi)
) 1
σ
ds −
1
Qmax
(
(u∗i+1)
σ − (u∗i )
σ
α(βi+1 − βi)
) 1
σ
(C.21)
A.2. If Smax > Qmax
i∑
k=1
ηk =
1
Smax Qmax
∫ gj,j+1(Qmax)
0
(
sσ +
(u∗i+1)
σ − (u∗i )
σ
α(βi+1 − βi)
) 1
σ
ds + 1
−
1
Qmax
(
(u∗i+1)
σ − (u∗i )
σ
α(βi+1 − βi)
) 1
σ
−
1
Smax
(
Qσmax −
(u∗i+1)
σ − (u∗i )
σ
α(βi+1 − βi)
) 1
σ
(C.22)
B. For groups 1 ≤ i < i◦ (on the left from the group saturates its participa-
tive constraint), gi,i+1(0) =
(
(u∗i )
σ−(u∗i+1)
σ
α(βi+1−βi)
) 1
σ
> 0, so the expression (C.16)
becomes:
B.1. If Smax ≤ Qmax
i∑
k=1
ηk =
1
SmaxQmax
∫ Smax
Simin
(
sσ −
(u(i))σ − (u(i+1))σ
α(βi+1 − βi)
) 1
σ
ds, (C.23)
where Simin =
(
(u∗i )
σ − (u∗i+1)
σ
α(βi+1 − βi)
) 1
σ
B.2. If Smax > Qmax
i∑
k=1
ηk =
1
SmaxQmax
∫ gj,j+1(Qmax)
Simin
(
sσ −
(u∗i )
σ − (u∗i−1)
σ
α(βi+1 − βi)
) 1
σ
ds+
+ 1−
1
Smax
(
Qσmax −
(u∗i+1)
σ − (u∗i )
σ
α(βi+1 − βi)
) 1
σ
(C.24)
where Simin =
(
(u∗i )
σ − (u∗i+1)
σ
α(βi+1 − βi)
) 1
σ
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